KOWA YA TUNA BARA!
EDITION 16
GENERAL SANI ABACHA AND OIL AND GAS IN NIGERIA: REFINERIES, NLNG AND EFFORTS TO HARNESS NATIONAL RESOURCES — WHAT WAS STARTED, WHAT WAS ACHIEVED, AND WHAT REMAINED UNFINISHED?
ALFIJIR LABARAI
Oil and natural gas have long been among Nigeria’s most important natural resources and major sources of government revenue. However, despite the country’s substantial oil and gas reserves, refinery problems, inadequate domestic petrol production and dependence on imported petroleum products have remained persistent challenges.
In this 16th edition of KOWA YA TUNA BARA!, Alfijir Labarai examines the state of Nigeria’s oil refineries and gas industry during the administration of General Sani Abacha. The report distinguishes between projects inherited by his government, initiatives undertaken during his tenure and developments that reached the production stage after his death.
OIL REFINERIES: LOW OUTPUT AND PERSISTENT REPAIR PROBLEMS
Human Rights Watch’s January 1999 report, The Price of Oil, provides important information about the challenges facing Nigeria’s petroleum industry in the late 1990s.
According to the report, in July 1997, Nigeria’s refineries were producing fewer than five million litres of petrol per day, while estimated domestic demand stood at approximately 18 million litres daily.
The gap between domestic production and demand illustrates the scale of the country’s difficulties in meeting its petrol needs through local refining and the continuing importance of imported petroleum products.
In December 1997, the allocation of crude oil to the refineries was reduced to 150,000 barrels per day because of equipment problems.
This suggests that the challenges went beyond crude oil availability. Equipment failures and difficulties associated with refinery maintenance also affected domestic production.
KADUNA REFINERY: REPAIR EFFORTS WITHOUT A FULL RETURN TO OPERATION
The Kaduna Refinery was among the facilities affected by operational difficulties during this period.
Human Rights Watch reported that efforts were made to repair the refinery with the involvement of Total. However, the refinery had still not returned to operation as of November 1998.
The report also recorded differing estimates of the repair costs. One figure cited was approximately US$240 million, while NNPC and the relevant minister reportedly gave an estimate of US$170 million.
These figures must be understood in their proper context. The existence of differing cost estimates does not, by itself, establish that a crime was committed or that public funds were misappropriated.
The evidence supports a more limited conclusion: repair efforts took place during the period, but the report did not establish that the Kaduna Refinery had resumed operations before the end of Abacha’s administration.
WARRI REFINERY: A MAJOR EQUIPMENT FAILURE
The Human Rights Watch report also documented a problem at the Warri Refinery in November 1998, when its fluid catalytic cracker failed.
This unit plays an important role in processing petroleum feedstock into useful products, including components used in petrol production. According to the report, following the failure, none of Nigeria’s refineries had an operational unit of this type at that time.
In September 1998, NNPC had appointed Shell as a technical adviser for repairs to the Port Harcourt refinery complex.
These developments show that steps were being taken to address refinery problems, including seeking technical assistance. Nevertheless, serious operational difficulties continued to affect domestic petroleum production.
It would therefore be inaccurate to claim, on the basis of the available evidence, that all Nigerian refineries had been fully rehabilitated and restored to effective operation during Abacha’s administration.
NLNG: CONSTRUCTION BEGAN UNDER ABACHA, BUT PRODUCTION STARTED LATER
Another important part of this investigation concerns Nigeria LNG Limited, commonly known as NLNG. The company was established to process natural gas into liquefied natural gas (LNG), which can be transported to international markets.
According to the official history published by NLNG, the company was incorporated in 1989, before Abacha came to power.
However, a major investment decision to develop the first two production trains was taken in November 1995, and construction began in February 1996, during Abacha’s administration.
This was an important stage in the project’s development. Nevertheless, the start of construction must not be confused with the commencement of commercial production.
NLNG’s official records state that Train 2 began producing LNG on 15 September 1999, while Train 1 started production on 27 February 2000. Both milestones occurred after Abacha’s death in June 1998.
The historical distinction is therefore clear: construction of the first two production trains began during Abacha’s administration, but LNG production commenced after his government had ended.
This distinction is important for an accurate assessment of the project. It recognises the decisions and construction activities undertaken during his tenure without attributing the entire subsequent achievement to a single administration.
CONTRACT ALLEGATIONS: DISTINGUISHING REPORTS FROM PROVEN CRIMES
The Human Rights Watch report also discussed concerns and allegations relating to petroleum import contracts and the quality of some petroleum products.
Such claims require careful journalistic treatment. An allegation or concern reported by an organisation should not automatically be presented as an established criminal offence. A claim must be assessed against the available evidence, and criminal responsibility should not be asserted without an adequate basis, such as a relevant court finding.
For this reason, this investigation does not accuse any individual of corruption or embezzlement solely on the basis of the allegations discussed in the report.
The objective is to present what the source documented, distinguish allegations from established facts and allow readers to assess the historical record using the available evidence.
WHAT CAN WE CONCLUDE?
A review of the available evidence highlights four key findings.
First, Nigeria’s refineries faced serious production and equipment problems in the late 1990s, including during Abacha’s administration.
Second, repair efforts were undertaken at some facilities, and technical assistance was sought. However, the evidence reviewed does not establish that all the refineries had returned to full operation before the end of his government.
Third, the NLNG project made significant progress during Abacha’s tenure through the investment decision and the commencement of construction. Actual LNG production, however, began after his death.
Fourth, allegations relating to petroleum contracts and industry management must be presented according to the strength and status of the available evidence. Allegations should not be converted into established findings of criminal wrongdoing without adequate proof.
The history of Nigeria’s oil and gas sector during Abacha’s administration cannot accurately be reduced to a story of either complete success or complete failure. The available records show that some important projects advanced, while refinery problems persisted and some major milestones were reached only after his tenure.
A responsible historical assessment requires us to identify what was done, acknowledge what remained unfinished and draw conclusions only where the evidence supports them.
KOWA YA TUNA BARA!
ALFIJIR LABARAI — Truth • Timeliness • Trust
SOURCES AND REFERENCES
1. Human Rights Watch — The Price of Oil (January 1999)
The report documents Nigeria’s oil industry, refinery problems, petrol production shortages and related concerns during the period.
[Read the Human Rights Watch report](https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/nigeria0199.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
2. Nigeria LNG Limited — Official Production Plant History
NLNG’s official history provides information about the company’s establishment, the investment decision for the first two production trains, the start of construction and the dates on which production commenced.
[Read NLNG’s official production plant history](https://www.nigerialng.com/operations/production-plant.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
3. Bureau of Public Enterprises — Warri Refining and Petrochemicals Company Limited
This official institutional page provides background information about the Warri Refining and Petrochemicals Company.
[Read the BPE profile of Warri Refinery](https://www.bpe.gov.ng/warri-refining-petrochemicals-company-limited-wrpc/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
This report draws on the sources listed above to examine refinery performance, repair efforts and the development of NLNG. It distinguishes documented historical information from allegations that have not been established as criminal findings.
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